For a man who once wrote that “History does not consist of
individuals,” Karl Marx’s life has received quite a bit of attention. From
Communist governments which have sought to exult his memory to the extent that
the Soviet Union concealed Engel’s death bed confession that Marx had fathered
a son with his housekeeper, to Capitalist apologists who have equated Marx’s
domineering personal tendencies with the totalitarianism of latter communist
regimes, the biography of Marx has served as blank slate for the projection of
preconceived notions of communism, driven primarily by events that occurred
long after Marx’s death.
Jonathan Sperber’s biography, Karl
Marx: A Nineteenth-Century Life, seeks to return Marx’s biography to the
context in which his life occurred, namely nineteenth century Europe. What
emerges from this effort is a portrait of a man whose ideas were shaped by
events and ideas quite foreign from the world of 20th and 21st
centuries when most of the debates about the theory and application of them
have occurred.
In particular, two concepts, very important to the 18th
century Prussia Marx was born in, but increasingly less important as the
decades past, form a basis for much of Marx’s thought: namely a focus on the
French Revolution as a model for future revolutions and the dialectical ideas
of Hegel. In this regard, many of the concerns and sensibilities of Marx were
anachronisms in his own time. One of the most interesting parts of the
biography is an extended examination of Marx’s relationship with scientifically
based positivist philosophy, which came to eclipse Marx’s
preferred dialectical philosophy during his own lifetime.
All of this is not to say that the portrait of Marx in Sperber’s
biography is not without relevance today. In particular, Marx’s participation
in and the lessons he learned from the major revolutionary events of his era offer
an interesting perspective about how to understand the upheavals of the last
few years from the Occupy Wall-Street Movement to the Arab Spring.
Additionally, Speber shows, Marx did not always fight against these
changes and to a large extent embraced them near the end of his life. In one
particularly interesting passage, a quote from the Communist Manifesto describing poverty in distinctly dialectical
terms is juxtaposed with another quote from sixteen years after the manifesto
was published in which the poverty is described in far more scientific,
positivist, language. Sperber concludes,
“Dialectics were gone. In its place was a scientific definition of
malnutrition, complete with the requisite number of grains of nitrogen, and the
results of survey research.”
Ultimately, this biography is a reminder of the failure of relying on
personal history to assess ideas. Throughout Marx’s life, many of the positions
he took had nothing to do with his wider theories, which themselves were in a
constant state of evolution. Indeed, many of the positions he took were dictated
by personal conflicts and animosities. Marx himself acknowledged this
deficiency when he famously said “Je ne suis pas Marxiste” (I am not a
Marxist), in reference to the brand of his though that had taken hold in
France. The true importance of Marx is
not in his life or personal qualities, as interesting as they may be, but
instead in the line of thinking he introduced.
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